COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Sealab Program Enters Third Phase

Five teams of Navy and civilian aquanauts will begin a new series of experiments at the ocean's bottom off San Clemente Island, Calif., this fall during the third phase of the Navy's "Man-in-the-Sea" program Sealab III.

Operating at a depth of 600 feet, the aquanauts will carry out a series of experiments in salvage techniques, oceanographic and marine biological research, and physiological and human performance during the 60-day operation.

Objective of the Sealab series, Navy and Department of Defense officials explain, is "to gain knowledge and know-how pertinent to the adaptation of man to the deep sea environment at ambient pressure."

Of primary interest to both the Navy and DOD in the Sealab series is providing the U.S. with the capability for deep-water rescue and salvage operations, maintenance of bottom-mounted equipment, and utilization of the continental shelf for assistance in military operations.

The program also has "vast secondary gains for the nation," according to DOD officials. "The technology gained in the Man-in-the-Sea will hasten and make possible the exploitation of the world's continental shelves for food, minerals, and recreation. The economic and scientific potential of the sea is perhaps as great or

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RETURNING TO STATES—Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Force Vietnam, since June 1964, will leave his post in July to relieve Gen. Harold K. Johnson as Army Chief of Staff. Gen. Johnson, who will complete his second two-year tour of duty as Chief of Staff in July, has requested to be retired, according to a White House announcement. No successor has been named for Gen. Westmoreland.

Permanent Authority Sought for Special RVN Extension Leave

The Department of Defense has requested Congress to make permanent the authority to grant special 30-day leaves to uniformed service members who voluntarily commit themselves for at least six months additional duty in a hostile fire area.

Present authorization expires June 30, 1968.

The special leave is not chargeable to any other leave account, can be taken at a selected location, (which in most cases could be expected to be in the U.S.) and transportation provided at Government expense.

Testifying before a House Armed Services Subcommittee, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Military Personnel Policy) said, "Were it not for this legislation, any leave granted under such a program would be chargeable to the individual's leave account, including all travel time. Additionally, transportation could be furnished only on a space available basis."

The deputy, Gen. William W. Berg, USAF, explained that for the period from Nov. 2, 1966, date of enactment of the special 30-day leave legislation, through Dec. 31, 1967, a total of 1,309 officers and 48,036 enlisted personnel have volunteered to incur an additional period of service of at least six months duration in a hostile fire area.

Gen. Berg said, "While the numbers have been substantial we believe that the value of the continuation of this legislation rests on the quality

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DOD Issues Statistics On Vietnam Volunteers

More than 175,000 members of the Army and Navy have volunteered for service in Vietnam since 1965, according to statistics released March 15 by the Department of Defense.

The Air Force and Marine Corps do not keep statistics on the number of volunteers for Vietnam duty nor does the Navy keep statistics on the number of officer volunteers.

Additionally, during the period Nov. 2, 1966, through Dec. 31, 1967, more than 50,000 service personnel extended their tours for an additional six months in the combat zone.

In the Army more than 135,000 personnel have volunteered for duty in Vietnam in the past three and a half years.

In the Navy 41,450 enlisted personnel have volunteered since April 1965, the beginning of the Navy's increased commitment ashore in Vietnam.

Gen. Clarke and Publisher Say Hanoi Pushes Fail

Apparently plan Phase III of General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander in chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, is taking place against allied forces in South Vietnam.

Phases I and II of Giap's plan produced no material results since its inception last summer, when allied strategy was causing the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong continually to lose ground.

This was contained in a report by Gen. Bruce C. Clarke (USA-ret.) and Frank W. Mayborn, publisher, of Temple, Tex., following a 16-day visit to Vietnam. They were accompanied by Col. James R. Hillard (USA), military assistant, deputy assistant secretary for civil rights and industrial relations.

Their findings and recommendations appeared in the Feb. 26 Congressional Record.

As for Giap's Phase III, findings of Gen. Clarke and Mr. Mayborn note that at the west end of the DMZ, blocking the invasion routes over the trails leading from Laos, lies the U.S. Marine major outpost of Khe Sanh. It is important to our holding the two Northern Provinces of South Vietnam.

"For some time Giap has been building up his North Vietnamese forces around Khe Sanh with a view to its capture with a resultant military and psychological victory. It is the key to his Phase III strategy.

"The allies are aware of the threat and are reacting to it to be well prepared. They fully expect to defeat this Phase III also."

Their report goes on, telling of advantages to the allies in Vietnam. Listed are strategic air power, close air support, great fire power, mobility, naval support, communications, medical support, logistics support, strategic intelligence, armor units, mechanical support equipment.

It is obvious that these advantages will play a great part in Phase III and should be decisive. . . . There will be no surprise.



What will North Vietnam do if Phase III fails?

1—Start a preliminary peace offensive?

2—Offer to negotiate? or

3—Withdraw the NVN troops into Laos and Cambodia and into NVN and break off the war? It will be recalled that Ho Chi Minh has never admitted any NVN troops in SVN.

The report of Gen. Clarke and Mr. Mayborn states that in early February the enemy units that carried out the Tet offensive were not all VC. Some had as high as 70 percent North Vietnamese fillers. Many of the prisoners captured were boys 12-14 years of age—some having been in the units only a few days. There were even women in their ranks—some were captured.

Regarding U.S. forces command and leadership, the report said practically all of the general officers have had experience in two wars before Vietnam. They are highly schooled, selected, dedicated and motivated. They believe strongly in what they are doing. . . . As you progress down the echelons of command you find the same relative professional competence.

Listed among conclusions of Gen. Clarke and Mr. Mayborn, drawn from discussions and observations, are:

• The future of Vietnam is based on security and development assistance especially on the District level. This security which must come first is dependent upon the ability of the Vietnamese Army units to perform their missions. This requires their adequate equipping and rapid development.

• Long-range thought on the military, political and diplomatic levels should be given to what to do next after the pending battle of Khe Sanh. Any victory should be promptly exploited.

• The bombing should be continued until its halting will not lower the threshold of infiltration or ammunition, men and supplies into South Vietnam. Unless this is done, the price will be greatly increased allied casualties.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA*

The Statement of Principles enunciated at the Manila Conference of October 1966 continues to guide our efforts in Southeast Asia. These principles include the following four points:

- Aggression must not succeed in South Vietnam.
- We must break the bonds of poverty, illiteracy and disease throughout Asia and the Pacific area.
- We must strengthen economic, social and cultural cooperation within the region.
- We must seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia.

Freedom from Aggression

The seven participating nations agreed that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government and that this commitment shall be backed by military force and other efforts as necessary.

But at the same time, the seven nations also proclaimed their readiness to pursue any and all avenues which might lead to a secure and just peace, either through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal action on both sides to reduce the level of violence. They made it clear that their sole demand on the leaders of North Vietnam is that they abandon their aggression. More specifically, the Manila Declaration stated that:

"Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

These are still our policies. As you well know, the U.S. Government has continued to explore every possible means of achieving a just settlement of the Vietnam conflict. These efforts have thus far yielded no positive results, but our search for peace continues.

Need for Allied Shield

The importance of our efforts in Vietnam to the ultimate achievement of economic development, area cooperation and political independence in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific is accepted not only by the seven nations actively involved in the conflict, but by leaders of other Asian nations as well. Prime Ministers Sato of Japan and Lee of Singapore are among those who have recently spoken out in unequivocal fashion on the need for the allied shield in Vietnam to permit orderly Asian development.

The Suharto regime in Indonesia, though remaining unaligned, is painfully aware of the sources of danger. Wholesale North Vietnamese violation of Laotian territory has been officially denounced by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Burma and Cambodia also recognize the threats of Chinese Communist pressures. This is not to imply that these nations will revamp their present foreign policies, but it does suggest that even those least willing to appear aligned with the United States are increasingly disturbed about Red Chinese or North Vietnamese designs.

Regional Cooperation

The turmoil in Vietnam has tended to obscure the substantial progress being achieved elsewhere in the area. The time being purchased in Vietnam at such heavy cost is being put to good use by the non-Communist Asian states and there is a growing appreciation of the need for collective action to meet common problems.

The most significant regional development during the past year was the formation in August of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, comprising Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The Association is starting modestly with annual Foreign Ministers meetings and proposed economic, social, and technical programs.

Thus, there is a growing web of cooperation among the area's non-Communist nations, comprising both functional efforts focused on common practical problems and broader ties with more ambitious goals. We can hope that such evolving mechanisms will eventually provide the region the collective political, economic and military strength necessary to guarantee that its destiny will be determined by these nations themselves.

The U.S. Role

Our role in this process will be particularly important. First we must see the Vietnam conflict through to a conclusion that permits the growth and maturing of regional cooperation. We will, of course, maintain our SEATO, ANZUS and other commitments in the area. We should also continue our carefully structured assistance to countries in the area.

Beyond this, American policy toward Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific area must blend concern and restraint as we help the East Asian nations build among themselves the true security that flows from economic and social progress. We must lend support and assistance, where requested, yet remain constantly aware that these countries are both equipped and entitled to lead themselves, and that it is in our interest that they do so.

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* *Excerpts from the recent Posture Statement by the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee.*

Combat Leave

(Continued from Page 1)

of the results rather than on numerical magnitude.

"Theoretically, the longer tours have some effect on the requirements for replacements and hence, result in some savings to offset the out-of-pocket costs for the leave and transportation. The value of the proposal, however, is not in savings achieved, but rather in effectiveness attained."

Making reference to the present authority Gen. Berg stated, "The acceptability of this legislation by our servicemen is readily apparent from the over 49,000 members who have taken advantage of the leave and government-furnished transportation features. A recent survey of men taking advantage of this program revealed that 66 percent were assigned to a combat unit or a unit in direct support of combat troops, 26 percent wanted the extension so that they could return to their unit and continue in the job they were doing, and 70 percent would not have extended without this special leave program."

Gen. Berg's testimony also covered the normal tour of duty in Vietnam which is 12 months. He said, "From the point of view of stability and continuity, the 12-month tour is less than ideal. Nevertheless, it is our opinion, and General Westmoreland agrees, that an involuntary increase in the tour length would be inequitable and could adversely affect morale. We have reviewed the tour policy on several occasions, and it remains our firm conviction that retention of the 12-month tour is essential to combat efficiency, health and morale, and that except for the most senior officers, any extensions should be entirely voluntary. . . .

"Data which we have maintained since the passage of this law (Public Law 89-735) confirms the views previously expressed by our senior commanders in Vietnam that a number of individuals would volunteer to serve longer than the required period of service in Vietnam, because of personal dedication to the mission, if the period of service could be broken into reasonable segments."



Sealab III Experiments

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greater than that available on land surfaces."

Navy plans call for aquanaut teams to live in advanced sea habitations on the continental shelves for 30 or more days without coming to the surface. This will be accomplished by 1970. During Sealab III, the five teams will spend 12 days each under water. The depth capability will ultimately be extended from the average 600-foot depths of the shelves down to the physiological limits of man.

The Man-in-the-Sea program is but one part of the Navy's Deep Submergence Systems Project and the Deep Ocean Technology effort. According to Cdr. M. Scott Carpenter, former astronaut who became one of the Navy's first aquanauts, the Navy is developing, through the construction of small versatile submersibles, "the capability to transfer people from one submerged submarine to another. When these new submersibles are ready, the Navy will have the means to quickly locate a disabled submarine and to rescue the crew.

"We are also developing a search submersible, capable of exploring the ocean floor to depths of 20,000 feet. This means that roughly two-thirds of the surface of our planet, which in the past has been largely inaccessible, except by remote instrument probes, will become open for exploration."

Cdr. Carpenter said the Navy has a program underway which would allow for the salvage of large objects—such as a sunken submarine—from depths to 850 feet. "We are currently limited to objects of considerably smaller size and to less than half the depth."

Under the Deep Ocean Technology program, the Navy is conducting research into the development of the necessary technology to move deeper into the ocean depths, including advanced bio-medical research and work with glass as a substitute for metal in the fabrication of pressure hulls.

During the coming year, Cdr. Carpenter said, there will be increased emphasis on the development of more suitable aquanaut equipment, including:

- Newer and better system engineered breathing apparatus;
- New tools for the diver;
- Improved lifting devices;
- More effectively heated suits;
- Small power packs and ocean floor power sources, and
- Diver communication and navigation equipment and a host of other items which are required if the Navy is to make man an effective operative in the deep ocean.

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